Deadly Dust: Occupational Health and Safety as a Driving Force in Workers’ Compensation Law and the Development of Tort Doctrine and Practice by Conk, George
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2017
Deadly Dust: Occupational Health and Safety as a
Driving Force in Workers’ Compensation Law and
the Development of Tort Doctrine and Practice
George Conk
Fordham University School of Law, gconk@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
George Conk, Deadly Dust: Occupational Health and Safety as a Driving Force in Workers’ Compensation Law and the Development of Tort
Doctrine and Practice, 69 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1139 (2017)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/925
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078799 
  
 
1139 
DEADLY DUST: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY AS A 
DRIVING FORCE IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TORT DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE 
COMMENTARY 
George W. Conk* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.     A GOOD DEAL .................................................................................. 1140 
II.   THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE .... 1146 
III. SILICOSIS: THE KING OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES........................ 1149 
A. Breaking through the germ theory paradigm— 
deadly dust ................................................................................. 1151 
B. The Hawks Nest tunnel disaster .......................................... 1152 
IV. ASBESTOS: THE MIRACLE MINERAL AND THE NIGHTMARE THAT 
FOLLOWED .................................................................................. 1154 
A. The era of mass tort claims—asbestos ................................. 1157 
V.  THIRD-PARTY MASS PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION INVIGORATED 
TORT ............................................................................................ 1159 
A. The organizational challenge ............................................... 1159 
B. Expert testimony—Daubert and the ‘Junk Science’ battle: 
raising the quality of expert testimony .............................. 1160 
C. Doctrinal challenges.............................................................. 1167 
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I was delighted to receive Professor Jay Feinman’s invitation to comment. Not 
only did I graduate from Rutgers Law School, but a few years ago, the Fordham Urban 
Law Journal published my history of the school, People’s Electric: Engaged Legal 
Education at Rutgers-Newark in the 1960s and 1970s, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503 (2012). 
This symposium demonstrates that engagement with the lives of citizens remains alive 
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Health Advocacy Institute and Wendy Parmet are two leading writers about public 
health. And now we have Emily Spieler’s carefully researched paper.  
And of course, thanks to Bob Rabin, the dean of torts teacher whose casebook I 
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 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078799 
  
1140 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1139 
VI. NETWORKS AND WEBS: FROM MASS PRODUCTION TO 
ATOMIZATION AND DIGITALIZATION ........................................... 1168 
I. A GOOD DEAL 
The “Grand Bargain,” is the exchange of workers’ tort remedies 
against their employers, for an exclusive, assured “strict” but 
limited . . . liability.”1 As Robert Rabin has explained, workers lost an 
unreliable common law right to sue employers for negligently caused, 
accidental injury.2 In exchange, a statutory remedy assured recoveries 
for accidental injuries arising from and in the course of employment.3 
Aside from the exclusive remedy against the employer, as Professor 
Rabin points out, tort has persisted, with its promise of full 
compensation rather than the limited scheduled benefits of workers’ 
compensation.4 The third-party action is also complementary because 
workers’ compensation health and wage replacement benefits enable 
workers to survive and to subsist while third-party actions are 
pending as Professor Rabin notes—and as my thirty years of practice 
as a plaintiff’s lawyer confirms.5 The massive, and often protracted, 
third-party asbestos product-liability litigation is prime evidence of 
that.6 In a comprehensive article, overseer of asbestos Multi-District 
Litigation 875 (“MDL-875”) District Judge Eduardo Robreno has set 
forth the history of that federal consolidation of claims.7 Employers (or 
their workers’ compensation insurers) hold liens on third-party actions 
which enable them to recover benefits they have paid.8 Third-party 
actions thus offset the costs to employers of the Centers for Disease 
 
 1. Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work 
Injuries in the United States, 1900–2017, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 891, 892 (2017). 
 2. Robert L. Rabin, Accommodating Tort Law: Alternative Remedies for Workplace 
Injuries, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2017). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1123–24. 
 5. Id. at 1124. 
 6. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS 
TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 20–21 (1985), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports 
/2006/R3324.pdf. 
 7. Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict 
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 108–09 (2013). 
 8. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-40 (West 2007). New Jersey’s law is typical; an 
employer holds a first dollar lien against a third-party recovery, reduced by one third for 
counsel fees incurred by the plaintiff. Id. 
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Control and Prevention (“CDC”)-estimated $25 billion annual cost of 
work-related vehicular accidents.9 
But this Article suggests that calling the rise of workers’ 
compensation laws across the country from 1910–193010 a Grand 
Bargain understates the workers’ gains. It was not much of a bargain 
for employers. Rather it was a grand victory for workers and for the 
public health. It was the first mechanism to provide critical health 
insurance to nearly every worker, regardless of fault, rank, or wage. In 
an era in which health, hospital, and disability insurance were either 
not widely available or unavailable,11 workers gained guaranteed 
accidental health and disability insurance coverage for the 
overwhelming majority of workers injured on the job.12 
One measure of the strength of the workers’ gains is that states did 
not follow the example of the Federal Employees Liability Act 
(“FELA”).13 That 1908 law allowed tort actions against negligent 
employers of railroad workers injured while engaged in interstate 
commerce.14 The measure ruled out common law defenses such as 
contributory negligence and established a comparative fault 
apportionment regime.15 Yet only seamen followed the FELA’s eased 
tort-claim path as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 extended coverage 
to offshore sailors.16 
As Emily Spieler recounts, the basic structure of the workers’ 
compensation bargain has been detailed by the premier historian John 
Witt17 and in Arthur Larson’s authoritative treatise—Workers’ 
Compensation Law.18 In my view, the compromise has been 
 
 9. On-the-Job Vehicle Crashes Cost Employers $25 Billion Annually, CDC FOUND. (Aug. 
24, 2016), http://www.cdcfoundation.org/pr/2016/job-vehicle-crashes-cost-us-employers-25-
billion-annually. 
 10. See generally Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of 
Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305 (1998). 
 11. Marc Lichtenstein, Health Insurance from Invention to Innovation: A History 
of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, 
http://www.bcbs.com/blog/health-insurance.html#.V_xLstUZbME.blogger (last visited Nov. 
10, 2017). 
 12. 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (2017). 
 13. Federal Employees Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012).  
 14. § 51. 
 15. § 53. 
 16. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (codified as 
amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012)).  
 17. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, 
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 128–29 (2004); see also 
Spieler, supra note 1. 
 18. See generally LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (2017). 
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undervalued in the discussion today. The doctrines of contributory 
negligence, the fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk were indeed 
(in the main) abolished in the 1911–1925 period when most states 
adopted workers’ compensation laws as an exclusive remedy.19 But the 
workers got the better end of the bargain because even a tort system 
without the unholy trinity of defenses was an unreliable road to what ill 
and injured workers needed most: medical care. The bargain was a 
larger labor victory than is often recognized. 
The FELA abolished the common law defenses (contributory 
negligence, fellow servant, assumption of risk) and adopted pure 
comparative fault.20 But it preserved the need to prove “that employer 
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury 
or death.”21 Since the tort remedy is a single lump sum payment, 
medical and wage replacement benefits did not flow as automatically as 
they do in workers’ compensation systems.22 Such needs were left to the 
collective bargaining process by the Railway Labor Act of 1926,23 which 
preceded the National Labor Relations Act.24 The workers’ compensation 
laws wisely avoided the FELA model, which, if universally embraced, 
would, like all tort actions, be inefficient, uncertain, and incomplete.25 
The structure adopted in the Progressive Era (1910–1925) 
persists: workers’ compensation laws provide universal coverage for 
all workers in an enterprise who suffer injury or illness “arising out of 
 
 19. WITT, supra note 17, at 67–72.  
 20. 45 U.S.C. §§ 53, 54; see also Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506–07 
(1957). 
Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with 
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the 
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. It does 
not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on grounds of 
probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee’s 
contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a 
jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with 
reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any 
part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make 
that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is 
made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other 
probabilities. The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay 
damages for injury or death due ‘in whole or in part’ to its negligence. 
Id.   
 21. Id. at 508; see also 45 U.S.C. § 51. 
 22. See 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW§ 1.01 (2017).  
 23. ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–165 (1935)).  
 24. ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). 
 25. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 6, at xxii. 
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and in the course of” their employment.26 The coverage includes 
medical care, wage loss replacement, partial and total disability and 
death benefits.27 Workers pay no premiums and there are no co-pays or 
deductibles.28 Benefits are not reduced or defeated by a worker’s own 
negligence.29 When the fact of injury “arising” from the work is 
apparent—as in a motor vehicle crash or a fall—medical care and 
temporary disability benefits are generally uncontested and flow 
quickly to the injured worker.30 Workers’ compensation provides such 
prompt maintenance and medical benefits. Lump sum cash tort awards 
do not. 
A compensation-claiming worker need prove only the fact of 
employment and a work connection to the illness or injury.31 Coverage 
extends to the great bulk of workers, regardless of rank, gender, race, 
or union membership. This universality, that a worker injured or 
sickened on the job is entitled to benefits regardless of fault, is the first 
such coverage for all benefit adopted in our history. The workers’ 
compensation laws preceded Social Security, which provided old-age 
benefits, as well as benefits for the blind and for crippled children.32 
Social Security benefits were not extended to disabled workers until 
1973.33 
The movement to workers’ compensation was among the first in a 
series of laws—many at the state level—that accomplished important 
objectives protecting workers’ health and safety. The Progressive Era34 
 
 26. 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (2017). 
 27. See SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44580, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 11 (2016). 
 28. See id. at 1. 
 29. Id. at 2–3. 
 30. 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (2017). 
 31. SZYMENDERA, supra note 27, at 11. 
 32. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 45 Stat. 620, 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1307 (1940)) (“An act to provide for the general welfare by establishing a 
system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more 
adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, 
maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment 
compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other 
purposes.”); Fishback & Kantor, supra note 10, at 305–07. 
 33. John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The History of a Federal 
Program Insuring Earners Against Disability, 66 SOC. SECURITY BULL., no. 3, 2005–2006.  
 34. Herbert K. Abrams, A Short History of Occupational Health, 22 ADVANCES IN 
MOD. ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY 33 (1994), reprinted in 22 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 34, 51–64 
(2001), http://courses.washington.edu/envh311/Readings/Reading_09.pdf. 
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also spawned limits on the hours of labor and child labor laws, like the 
one famously struck down in Lochner v. New York.35 
In the Depression Era, profound changes in the relations between 
workers and employers were enacted. Chief among these was the 1935 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),36 which established to right to 
“concerted action” and led to collective bargaining agreements 
strengthening labor unions and launching the era of employer-
provided health insurance.37 In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the 
United States Supreme Court abandoned Lochner and upheld a 
Washington law governing hours of work.38 The Federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) brought us the eight-hour day and 
entitlement to overtime pay.39 
Three decades would pass until a mass movement extended 
workers’ rights via Title VII of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
barring race and gender discrimination.40 The 1963 March on 
Washington, famous for Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a 
Dream” speech, had as its principal demand: “Jobs and Freedom.”41 
The Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969 created a 
federal remedy for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, commonly called 
 
 35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down law forbidding employers to require employees 
to work over sixty hours in a week). 
 36. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).  
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes 
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate 
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the 
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms 
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
§ 151. 
 37. See Lauren A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1994, at 3, 4–6, 
http://www.bls.gov/OPUB/MLR/1994/03/art1full.pdf.  
 38. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 
(1923) (Lochner-era opinion)).  
 39. ch. 676, § 7, 52 Stat. 1063 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(5) (2010)). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991)). Compensatory and punitive damages for intentional 
violations would later be added. Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1991)). For a history of the mass 
movement, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING 
YEARS 1954–63, 846–87 (1988). 
 41. March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RES. & 
EDUC. INST., http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_march 
_on_washington_for_jobs_and_freedom (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).  
  
2017] DEADLY DUST 1145 
“black lung.”42 The federal government paid claims for benefits filed 
before December 31, 1973.43 Claims filed later are paid for by the 
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, financed by the Coal Excise Tax.44 
Industrial accidents and occupational disease epidemics drove the 
movement to pass a national health and safety law.45 The labor 
unions, consumer advocates like Ralph Nader, and asbestos 
researcher Dr. Irving Selikoff were key allies in the campaign for a 
federal workplace safety law.46 But despite President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s support, no bill was passed during his term, ending in 1968.47 
After a precarious campaign,48 it was in Nixon’s administration that 
Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.49 The 
law created the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(“NIOSH”), as part of the CDC.50 The Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act of 1977 was another step forward for workplace safety.51 But not 
until 1994 did the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”) adopt an important measure for the recognition of 
occupational disease. The Hazard Communication regulation mandated 
Material Safety Data Sheets so that workers could know the chemical 
to which they were exposed.52 
The struggle continues. OSHA is thinly funded, its penalties are 
weak,53 and even its regulatory authority is questioned.54 Employers, of 
 
 42. Pub. L. No. 91-173, Title IV, 83 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 
901–945). 
 43. § 901. 
 44. 26 U.S.C. § 4121. 
 45. Judson MacLaury, The Job Safety Law of 1970: Its Passage Was Perilous, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1981, at 18, 20, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1981/03/art2full 
.pdf. 
 46. Id. at 22. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 
(2012)). 
 50. § 671 (creating NIOSH); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about 
/default.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (“NIOSH is part of the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention . . . .”). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–878). 
 52. Hazard Communication, 29 CFR 1910.1200(g) (2012) (requiring that the chemical 
manufacturer, distributor, or importer provide Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) (formerly 
MSDSs or Material Safety Data Sheets) for each hazardous chemical to downstream users 
to communicate information on these hazards). 
 53. MARTHA MCCLUSKEY ET AL., THE NEXT OSHA: PROGRESSIVE REFORMS TO 
EMPOWER WORKERS 1, 2, 10 (2012). 
 54. Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (2008). 
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course, have long sought to reduce their costs—often to the workers’ 
detriment—and workers have sought to protect and expand their 
benefits. I will discuss shortly the occupational disease struggles that 
were fought to expand the scope of protection. But for the moment I 
note again that the direct third-party tort action has been 
preserved—as have a narrow category of intentional injury cases.55 
As we will see below, the preservation of the third-party action—
particularly for product liability—supplemented workers’ 
compensation benefits and invigorated tort law. 
II. THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
I want to spend some time discussing this because it has received 
little attention so far and because it is a struggle that was hard fought 
and ultimately successful in many respects. Perhaps because of my 
experience as a plaintiffs’ lawyer in New Jersey for thirty years, I am 
less pessimistic than Emily Spieler is about occupational disease claims 
and more positive about what was accomplished. 
The struggle for recognition of occupational disease as a workers’ 
safety and health measure has often been a dramatic one. The Zadroga 
Act56 and tort settlements for demolition workers at the site of the 
World Trade Center disaster57 demonstrate the importance of both the 
compensation and tort remedies. The efforts of workers advocates and 
scientists to gain recognition of occupational diseases has informed 
and improved workers’ compensation law at the state and federal 
levels. It has driven the expansion of Social Security to include 
disability benefits, the Black Lung Benefits Act, the Coal Mine Safety 
and Health Act of 1969, and the 1977 Mine Safety and Health Act. 
And of course the overarching Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 which was driven in significant part by the emergence of the 
asbestos epidemic in the 1960s.58 These measures are examples of how 
 
 55. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Laidlow v. 
Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884, 886–87 (N.J. 2002); 1-1 LARSON’S WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LAW §1.01 (2017).  
 56. James Zadroga 9/11 Health & Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300mm–300mm-61 
(2012); see generally Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging: The 9/11 
Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 128–30 (2012). 
 57. Transcript of Proceedings at 54, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010) (No. 1:21 MC00100). 
 58. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 
73–93 (1983). 
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labor and progressive advocacy has come to benefit workers far 
beyond that of their own membership.59 
In 1964 Dr. Irving Selikoff organized the landmark international 
conference, Biological Effects of Asbestos. Sponsored by the New York 
Academy of Sciences, physicians and scientists from around the world 
reported their observations about the health effects of exposure to 
asbestos.60 The U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Standards 
reported that coverage of occupational diseases had developed more 
slowly than accidental injuries.61  And “coverage of the various dust 
diseases ha[d] lagged behind that of other occupational diseases.”62 
Professor Larson reports that the fear of the scale of silicosis claims had 
deterred adoption of them as within the scope of coverage.63 Thus New 
York, like Ohio and Nevada, retained lists of recognized diseases, rather 
than general inclusive definitions.64 At the time of the landmark New 
York conference, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that “by 
1920, 45 states and territories had workmen’s compensation laws. 
But only seven of these laws . . . and the Federal Employees’ 
Compensation Act[] had provided compensation for all occupational 
diseases.”65 
In 1964, due to the widespread industrial use of asbestos, the toll 
was still mounting and legal obstacles remained even to workers’ 
compensation. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that “time limits 
(regarding) length of exposure, to manifestation of the disease, and to 
the filing of claims are too short to take into account the slow maturing 
nature of dust disease.”66 States often limited medical benefits; 
aggregate indemnity benefits varied by state, and waivers were often 
permitted.67 
But as recognition of the asbestos epidemic grew, and the strict 
product liability movement swept the country in the 1960s,68 the 
 
 59. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, Dust Diseases and Workmen’s 
Compensation, in 132 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCIS., BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ASBESTOS 
722, 723 (1965). 
 60. IRVING J. SELIKOFF, Opening Remarks, in BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ASBESTOS, supra 
note 59, at 7–8. 
 61. 4-52 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 52.02 (2017). 
 62. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 59 at 744.  
 63. 4-52 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 52.02 (2017). 
 64. Id.  
 65. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 59. Only thirty 
states provided coverage for “all dust diseases.” Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402A Flourished and the 
Third Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 808–09 (2007). 
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momentum toward consumer and worker protection yielded the 
landmark Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.69 It established 
in the Department of Labor a federal workplace safety standard setting 
authority: OSHA.70 The Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration 1971 Emergency Temporary Standard limiting 
exposure to asbestos dust signaled the beginning of the end of new 
exposures to the disease, which had gained belated recognition.71 
Soon thereafter, the coal miners’ pneumoconiosis epidemic gained 
enough recognition to pass the federal Black Lung Benefits Act of 1973.72 
Administered by the Division of Coal Mine Workers’ Compensation, the 
law provides medical, total disability, and death benefits to those 
suffering from black-lung disease.73 Amended by the Mine Safety and 
Health Act of 1977,74 federal authority over mine health and safety was 
strengthened. The measure soon had a favorable impact.75 
As observed above, workers’ compensation laws initially extended 
only to accidental injury.76 But a protracted, determined—often trade 
union led—movement succeeded in gaining recognition of occupational 
diseases.77 As Emily Spieler observes, we have not realized the goals 
of the OSHA mandated 1972 National Commission on State 
Workmen’s Compensation Laws.78 The report’s “essential 
recommendations” called for no exemptions for small firms or 
government employees; full coverage for all “work-related diseases”—
not just specified diseases; weekly cash benefits for total disability—
temporary or permanent—of at least two-thirds of the statewide 
average weekly wage; and “[f]ull medical and physical rehabilitation 
 
 69. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-516, 84 Stat. 1590 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012)). 
 70. Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 6, 84 Stat. 1593 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 655 
(2004)); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132–1910.140 (2017).  
 71. Occupational Exposure to Asbestos: Regulation History, 59 Fed. Reg. 40964 (Aug. 
10, 1994). 
 72. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945 (2012). 
 73. Compliance Guide to the Black Lung Benefits Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 2001), 
https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dcmwc/regs/compliance/blbenact.htm.  
 74. Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–804 
(2012)). 
 75. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck & John R. Alford, Can the Government Regulate 
Safety? The Coal Mine Example, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 745, 755 (1980). 
 76. DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE POLITICS 
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 13 (1991). 
 77. Id.; Abrams, supra note 34, at 52–54. 
 78. Spieler, supra note 1, at 935. See 29 U.S.C. § 656 (2012). 
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services without statutory limits on dollar amount or length of time.”79 
But despite the downward trends outlined by Spieler, and persistent 
exclusions—such as for “casual labor,” domestic, and farm workers—
workers’ compensation has provided benefits to nearly all workers.80 
Typically, statutory medical and disability insurance coverage are 
without worker-paid premiums, co-pays, etc.81 The public, through 
Social Security Disability Insurance, absorbs much of the burden of 
long term disability.82 ButTexas excepted83mandatory workers’ 
compensation coverage assures that the bulk of work-related injury 
medical costs, and virtually all short-term total and permanent 
partial disability coverage, remains with the employing enterprise.  
III. SILICOSIS: THE KING OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 
The fight for recognition of occupational disease has been a long 
one. Though every state now has some form of coverage, the road was 
tortuous.84 Employers feared liability claims and insurers worried about 
the incalculable costs of prospective workers’ compensation claims.  
In order for a disease to be compensable it must be defined and 
recognized as causally work-related; in typical statutory language, the 
injury or disease must arise “out of and in the course of” employment.”85 
For silicosis the problems of definition and causation were substantial.  
At the start, there was an obstacle familiar to anyone who has read 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions86: the theory 
that progress is uneven, and is made when one explanatory model—a 
paradigm—replaces another. A prime example is that of John Snow, the 
 
 79. Notes and Brief Reports: Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s 
Compensation Laws, 35 SOC. SECURITY BULL., Oct. 1972, at 31, 31 [hereinafter Report on 
State Workmen’s Compensation Laws], https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v35n10/ 
v35n10p31.pdf.  
 80. 9-101 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 101 (2017); Spieler, supra note 1, 
at 990–91. 
  81. Christopher J. Boggs, Benefits Provided Under Workers Compensation Laws, ACAD. 
J. Blog (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2015/ 
03/23/360655.htm. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 423; 14-157 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 157.03[5] (2017) 
(stating that one-half of the states and the District of Columbia reduce workers’ 
compensation benefits when a worker receives SSDI); Benefits for People with Disabilities, 
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/disability (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
 83. See Spieler, supra note 1, at 931–32 (observing that coverage is mandatory except in 
Texas). 
 84. 4-52 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 52.02, 52.07 (2017). 
85.  See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 2012). 
 86. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).  
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father of modern epidemiology.87 As detailed in The Ghost Map, Snow 
proved by careful mapping that the origin of the 1854 cholera outbreak 
in London was a leaking septic tank’s fecal contamination of the Broad 
Street pump.88 Snow had demonstrated his theory in a decisive way, 
but physicians remained attached to their long-standing theory that 
“miasma”—foul odors—was the source of disease.89 Snow, a pioneer in 
the use of ether, rejected the theory—but he lacked proof of the 
mechanism of disease.90 
The miasma paradigm would not suffer a fatal blow until 1882 
when Robert Koch revolutionized the prevailing views of “consumption” 
(which today we call tuberculosis).91 Koch identified the tubercle 
bacillus, providing a key to understanding the etiology of the disease.92 
The bacteriologist’s finding was revolutionary: the source was not in the 
foul air, but in the transmission via sputum from one person to 
another.93 
The fight for occupational safety and health has largely been a 
product of the means of mass production—the coal mines, steel mills, 
foundries, textile mills, and all who have used asbestos.94 But the issue 
first gained attention when, in the granite quarries of the northeast, 
stone cutters’ work changed from hand drills and sledge hammers to 
steam-driven equipment.95 Pneumatic jackhammers were nicknamed 
widow makers.96 In 1910, the Barre Vermont Granite Cutters 
Journal—a union publication—warned of “granite cutters 
consumption.”97 Yet the immediate killer was not disabling silicosis—
serious as that was—but rather tuberculosis—the bacterial lung 
 
 87. David Vachon, Doctor John Snow Blames Water Pollution for Cholera Epidemic, 
OLD NEWS (May & June, 2005), http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/fatherofepidemiology_ 
part2.html#TWO.  
 88. STEVEN JOHNSON, THE GHOST MAP: THE STORY OF LONDON’S MOST TERRIFYING 
EPIDEMIC—AND HOW IT CHANGED SCIENCE, CITIES, AND THE MODERN WORLD 71–74 
(2006). 
 89. Id. at 74–75. 
 90. Id. at 144–48. 
 91. SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH—TUBERCULOSIS AND THE 
SOCIAL EXPERIENCE OF ILLNESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 179–80 (1994). 
 92. Id. at 179. 
 93. Id. at 179–93. 
 94. Coal miners suffered from pneumoconiosis, textile workers from byssinosis, and 
steel and foundry workers from chronic bronchitis and asbestosis. 10 Deadliest 
Occupational Diseases in History, HUM. RESOURCES MBA (Feb. 20, 2012), 
http://www.humanresourcesmba.net/10-deadliest-occupational-diseases-in-history.  
 95. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 38. 
 96. Id. at 41. 
 97. Id. at 39. 
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disease to which silicotic workers were especially vulnerable.98 While 
tuberculosis declined for the general population—thanks to the 
insights of the germ theory—the disease grew among granite cutters 
from 257.7 per 100,000 workers to 953.4 per 100,000 workers.99 At the 
end of World War I in 1917, only four states provided compensation for 
occupational disease.100 The rest adhered to the accidental injury 
model.101 
A. Breaking through the germ theory paradigm—deadly dust 
Bacteriologists, progressive public health workers, scientists, and 
physicians were understandably enthralled by the breakthrough 
germ theory’s enormous explanatory power. They resisted contrary or 
limiting evidence. The evolution of causal thinking about silicosis is 
recounted in the David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz’s masterful 
study Deadly Dust: Silicosis and the Politics of Occupational Disease 
in Twentieth Century America.102 Tuberculosis was seen as a disease 
of the poor, especially immigrants crowded in tenements.103 
Progressive ideology focused on social conditions and vice.104 Though 
some were innocent victims of poverty, others were “temporarily 
enfeebled” through “alcoholism,” and “other intemperate habits.”105 
Bacteriologists and others at the New York City Department of 
Health were of the view that “the danger of infection is largely 
diminished by thorough ventilation.”106 
In the enthrall of the germ theory and the haughtiness that the 
upper classes so often display to the lower, the public health 
community emphasized improvement of workers’ hygiene and their 
poor living conditions at home.107  
But a brilliant statistician, then an actuary for the Prudential 
Life Insurance Company of Newark, Frederick L. Hoffman proved 
to be a key player. His analyses played a major role in overcoming 
the prejudices and misunderstandings of hygiene-oriented public 
 
 98. Id. at 41. 
 99. Id. at 42. 
 100. Id. at 84. 
 101. Id. at 86. 
 102. Id. 
 103. ROTHMAN, supra note 91, at 181. 
 104. Id. at 183. 
 105. Id. at 184.  
 106. Id. at 183–85. 
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health workers.108 Hoffman conducted a careful study demonstrating 
the dose-response relationship between time in the cutting sheds and 
the development of silicosis.109 
By the mid-1920s, the germ theory’s limits had been recognized. 
Few doubted that inhalation of dust was the root of the lung problems 
affecting the workers.110 In collaboration with the Public Health 
Service and the Vermont Division of Industrial Hygiene, the granite 
cutters union began exhaustive studies of the occurrence of silicosis.111 
The 1924–1926 study was intended to set limits for dust exposure.112 
But the measures led to “little if any improvement.”113 Significant 
changes in production did not come about until the late 1930s when 
silicosis among foundry workers, potters, glass blowers, metal 
miners, and grinders had been recognized.114 Like the 1924–1926 
study, a 1937–1938 U.S. Public Health Service study confirmed that 
practically every cutter with 15 years of experience “could be 
expected to develop the disease.”115 
Recognition of silicosis as an occupational disease spurred 
successful lawsuits. In 1932, James Hackett, the head of New York’s 
Division of Industrial Hygiene, opined that successful civil actions had 
brought “silicosis within the range of practical politics.”116 But 
recognition of an occupational disease created other problems: insurers 
insisted on lung function tests, which often led to discharge of workers 
found to have developed silicosis.117 
B. The Hawks Nest tunnel disaster 
Attention to silicosis was heightened in 1936 when it was learned 
that at Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, as many as fifteen hundred men 
 
 108. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 42–43 
 109. Id.; Hoffman is more often remembered for, and his reputation soiled by, his 
specious studies asserting the intellectual inferiority of African Americans. See also Megan 
J. Wolff, The Myth of the Actuary: Life Insurance and Frederick L. Hoffman’s Race Traits 
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 110. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 43. 
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 113. Id. (quoting ANDREW D. HOSSEY ET AL., CONTROL OF SILICOSIS IN VERMONT 
GRANITE INDUSTRY, at x (1957)).  
 114. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 43. 
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had died of silicosis—almost half of whom were Union Carbide workers 
digging the Hawks Nest hydro-electric tunnel.118 The tragedy was 
powerfully memorialized by poet Muriel Rukeyser in The Book of the 
Dead.119 
Overwhelmingly black, the survivors returned home.120 The ill and 
families of the deceased received no workers’ compensation. The 
inadequacy of tort remedies was demonstrated; there were only 538 
suits for damages.121 The cases settled for an aggregate of $200,000—
of which one-third went to counsel fees. Tort thus provided 
compensation for only a fraction of those sickened.122 
Public awareness of silicosis dramatically increased due to the 
tragedy. With the support of the Roosevelt administration, Congress 
commissioned a study by the Secretary of Labor. In 1936, the 
progressive Secretary Florence Perkins123 convened a National Silicosis 
Conference.124 Despite the Secretary’s sympathy, the conference was 
industry dominated. Management argued that silicosis was a disease 
that had attracted “shyster” lawyers and “quack” doctors.125 Changes in 
techniques had the disease on the way out argued a lawyer for Owens-
Illinois Glass Company.126 
Rosner and Markowitz recount that John Frey of the American 
Federation of Labor argued at the conference that silicosis was a 
problem for workers even before they became disabled. When detected 
early, workers were often discharged.127 The disease was not a thing of 
the past, but rather continued to afflict workers by the hundreds of 
thousands or millions.128 The National Conference supported the 
development of exposure standards and urged that decisions on 
compensation be made by expert medical boards—not juries and 
judges.129 Despite the support of Perkins, the Department of Labor 
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Senate Bill 2256 introduced in 1939 failed.130 It would have provided 
funds to the states in order to give benefits to silicosis claimants.131 
With the arrival of war, public attention to the silicosis issue 
declined. At that time, the industrial efforts, particularly ship 
building, exposed as many as 4.5 million shipyard workers to asbestos 
as they filled bulkheads with the fire-retardant mineral. In the 1940s 
there was a flare up of interest due to the dreadful epidemic among 
zinc miners in the Tri-state Mining District near the intersection of 
Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma; the crisis was addressed by a Tri-
state Conference which drew Labor Secretary Florence Perkins.132 But 
after that flare-up, interest in occupational health again receded.133 
Eventually changes in production—the decline of granite cutting, etc.—
reduced the incidence of new exposures, antibiotics helped to reduce the 
rate of tuberculosis, and the issue faded from view until a similar but 
more dangerous pulmonary pneumoconiosis134 known as asbestosis 
again placed occupational disease in the “dusty trades” in the forefront 
of public attention.135 
IV. ASBESTOS: THE MIRACLE MINERAL AND THE NIGHTMARE THAT 
FOLLOWED 
In the 1950s, Dr. Irving Selikoff presided over a tuberculosis clinic 
in Paterson, New Jersey. He observed the incidence of lung disease 
among workers at the Union Asbestos and Rubber Company.136 
Attention had been drawn to asbestos and health when Dr. Selikoff 
initiated and organized the 1964 conference, Biological Effects of 
Asbestos.137 Selikoff brought together researchers from around the 
 
 130. Id. at 130–33. 
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world.138 The proceedings demonstrated the toll being inflicted  on 
workers who used the material.139 Eventually Selikoff would estimate 
the toll of the substance in an ongoing landmark study of insulation 
workers.140  In his landmark 1973 Borel v. Fibreboard141 opinion, 
Federal Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom noted that Selikoff’s study 
found that: 
Among the asbestos insulation workers examined by us, 
evidence of pulmonary asbestosis was present in almost half the 
men examined. In this evaluation, radiological change has been 
used as the sole criteria. . . . Analysis of our data indicates that 
radiologically evident pulmonary asbestosis varied directly with 
the duration of exposure. Insulation workers with relatively 
short periods of exposure have a significantly lower incidence of 
pulmonary asbestosis and this, when present, was generally of 
minimal extent.142 
The ongoing prospective study tracked insulations workers health. It, 
produced dramatic evidence of the illness and deaths caused by 
workplace asbestos exposure.143 Selikoff and Lee’s 1978 book144 would 
often be cited by courts. In a study for the U.S. Department of Labor, 
Selikoff described the enormity of the epidemic estimating that 21 
million Americans had been significantly exposed to asbestos.145 
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associated diseases. Paul MacAvoy of Yale University forecasts excess mortality 
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excess mesothelioma deaths and 55,120 excess lung cancer deaths through 2009. 
These estimates chart only asbestos-related deaths, not disabilities. 
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Selikoff’s authoritative studies were relied upon by courts146 in the 
litigation arising from New York naval shipyard work, and by OSHA in 
its 1986 Final Rule on asbestos.147 
After the 1964 New York conference there was no turning back. As 
Judge Robreno notes, Selikoff’s seminal methodical environmental 
studies of morbidity and mortality among insulation workers provided 
powerful and irrefutable proof that asbestos caused, not only lung 
scarring asbestosis, but also lung cancer and pleural and abdominal 
mesothelioma.148 Selikoff’s work and increasing environmental 
awareness were essential prologues motivating the passage in 1972 of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which was quickly followed by 
the emergency rule that effectively barred the use of asbestos.149 That of 
 
Not all individuals who were exposed to asbestos or even all of those who will die 
of asbestos-related diseases will actually bring suit. The Epidemiology Research 
Institute has estimated that Johns-Manville faces between 30,000 and 120,000 
suits, with 45,000 set as the most probable number. Paul MacAvoy has estimated 
that there will be over 200,000 new suits, while Conning and Company has 
placed between 83,000 and 178,000 by the year 2010. Despite substantial 
differences, all sources support the conclusion that asbestos producers and courts 
face an unprecedented number of claimants in the years to come. 
As latent claims are developing over time, the likelihood that an injured party 
will go to court is increasing rapidly. Only 3% of the asbestos-related deaths 
between 1967–1968 resulted in law suits, but by 1975–76, this figure had risen to 
32%. In estimating the numbers of future suits, experts are assuming that by 
1992 all asbestos-related deaths will result in litigation. When this increasing 
propensity to sue is combined with mounting numbers of injured parties the 
burden on both producers and courts stemming from the asbestos litigation 
becomes staggering. 
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course was an enormous advance, brought about by labor and health 
advocates. 
Neither silica exposure standards nor any research into the 
particular form of pneumoconiosis called asbestosis had prevented the 
ubiquitous industrial use of the mineral. The long latency periods of 
asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma meant that the epidemic 
first garnered close attention in the 1960s, while thousands of new 
exposures were still occurring. But once asbestos diseases were 
recognized, the compensation system was able to respond—even if 
inadequately. Workers got treated and received modest partial 
disability payments. The most ill received Social Security disability 
benefits, and their dependents received death benefits from workers’ 
compensation. The only force that could further reduce the workers’ 
losses was third-party product liability actions. 
A. The era of mass tort claims—asbestos 
In Borel v. Fibreboard, Judge Wisdom found the plaintiff’s 
evidence showed “that the defendant manufacturers either were, or 
should have been, fully aware of the many articles and studies on 
asbestosis.”150 During Clarence Borel’s thirty-three year working 
career from 1936 to 1969: 
[N]o manufacturer ever warned contractors or insulation 
workers, including Borel, of the dangers associated with 
inhaling asbestos dust or informed them of the [American 
Council of Governmental Industrial Hygienists] threshold limit 
values for exposure to asbestos dust. Furthermore, no 
manufacturer ever tested the effect of their products on the 
workers using them or attempted to discover whether the 
exposure of insulation workers to asbestos dust exceeded the 
suggested threshold limits.151 
Massive litigation followed. 
The course of the litigation has been described many times, but one 
of the most informative is an opinion by Court of Claims Judge 
Christine Nettesheim.152 Johns Manville sought to recover its losses 
from the United States, which had required asbestos in its 
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specifications for the Navy’s massive ship building campaign.153 Judge 
Nettesheim described the manner in which the asbestos material was 
used in Naval construction, capturing the dust-generating process.154 
Judge Nettesheim described the state of the litigation: “[Suits against 
Asbestos processor Johns Manville] were coming in at a rate of 425 per 
month as of 1982. One half of the cases pending in 1982 involved 
shipyard workers, and one half of this number resulted from exposures 
occurring solely or in part during World War II.”155 By 1986, 12,630 
cases had been filed against Johns Manville.156 
Laments about mass tort litigation are common: the bankruptcy of 
over seventy companies, enrichment of plaintiffs’ lawyers, seventy 
billion dollars on defense and indemnification, protracted litigation, 
clogged courts, political logjams that prevent an efficient mechanism to 
resolve claims, and evidence that the most seriously injured are 
underpaid and the minimally injured are overpaid.157 But, as discussed 
below, mass third-party litigation greatly increased the competence of 
the courts and improved the law. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers used the evidence amassed by the heroic New 
Jersey pulmonologist and others to determinedly confront the many 
difficult issues in asbestos cases: identification of the defendant 
suppliers; multiple suppliers; multiple employers; apportionment of 
liability; proving causation of disease; the impact of smoking, the 
problem of latency—delayed development of disease many years after 
inhalation—when witnesses and records (if any) were unavailable; and 
the increasingly skillful use of epidemiological evidence.158 The latter 
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had the benefit of equipping plaintiffs’ lawyers for the next wave of 
mass litigation—drugs and medical devices.159 
V. THIRD-PARTY MASS PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION INVIGORATED 
TORT 
Asbestos litigation challenged courts in three ways: its massive 
scale presented organizational challenges, delayed manifestation of 
disease, and multiple, often unmeasurable, exposures presented 
challenging problems of apportionment of liability. Complex scientific 
evidence regarding inferential proof of causation of disease was new to 
the courts, which now had to assess the reliability and sufficiency of 
epidemiological evidence. Epidemiology is not merely a statistical 
method. It is based on a combination of population studies, pathology, 
and clinical medicine.160  
A. The organizational challenge 
Asbestos third-party litigation challenged the courts because of the 
large number of cases, presenting courts with a choice: try cases one by 
one, allow FRCP 23 class actions, or manage the litigation collectively 
through multi district litigation which permits transfer of cases for 
“coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings”161, but in practice 
aggregated cases for settlement. The first option was a prescription for 
massive delays in justice—for both plaintiffs and defendants. Although 
it had some support,162 the class action approach was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.163 The Court 
there found that individual issues predominated over collective ones, 
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making mass personal injury actions uncertifiable as class actions.164 
The consequence was to establish the Multi-District Litigation Panel 
as the dominant form of management of large scale tort litigation for 
personal injuries.165 
B. Expert testimony—Daubert and the ‘Junk Science’ battle: raising the 
quality of expert testimony 
By 1991, it was estimated that there were 715,000 asbestos 
personal injury claims pending in federal and state courts.166 Almost 
all of them involved workplace exposures to the deadly mineral fibers. 
They presented judges with enormous challenges, not only in docket 
control, but also in legal doctrine. Judge Robreno, who managed the 
federal MDL-875 from 2008–2013, stated that “the cases involved 
‘difficult issues involving the interface of law and science intersect 
with the uncertainties of substantive law.’”167 Judge Robreno 
explained: 
Where there are multiple possible causes of the disability, may 
liability be apportioned among numerous defendants, or must 
the plaintiff prove that the wrongdoing of a particular 
defendant is the predominant cause? What is the liability of a 
parent corporation for claims against a subsidiary that were 
latent at the time the subsidiary was acquired? What is the 
applicable statute of limitations, and when should the period of 
limitation be deemed to have commenced? Are the plaintiffs 
entitled to compensation for “pain and suffering” associated 
with the fear of illness or death? All these legal issues are 
governed by the tort law of each state.168 
The scale and intensity of mass tort litigation magnified the 
issues, as Judge Robreno observed. Ours is an adversary system. Each 
side tests the other’s evidence, and tries to present its own most 
effectively.  
 
 164. Id.  
 165. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 22.35–.37 (2004); Eldon 
E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324–
25 (2008); Hellerstein et al., supra note 56, at 176–77. 
 166. See generally Rothstein, supra note 157. 
 167. Robreno, supra note 7, at 106 (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The 
Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 591 (2007)). 
 168. Robreno, supra note 7, at 107 (quoting Carrington, supra note 177, at 591). 
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Causation of disease is a particularly closely contested issue.  It 
has long roots. The drive to identify ground stone dust rather than 
germs, nutrition, or hygiene as the cause of granite workers’ lung 
disease had helped to advance the use of bio-statistics. Frederick 
Hoffman, the Prudential actuary, became an important figure on whom 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics relied.169 Since silicosis had a single 
cause, little, if any, attention was given to apportionment of liability 
because joint and several liability was the law at the time, and 
contributory negligence was a complete defense.170 
Silicosis is a signature disease.  It is attributable only to silica 
dust. More problematic is how to infer individual causation among 
multiple sufficient causes. One hundred years ago the New York Court 
of Appeals struggled with an upturn in the incidence of typhoid in 
upstate New York.171 The City of Rochester had two systems of water 
supply, one potable supply for drinking water and the other a non-
potable supply for firefighting.172 The potable water became 
contaminated and many became sick.173 But typhoid was an endemic 
disease with many possible sources. The court rejected the argument 
that the plaintiff must rule out all possible non-negligent causes.174 It 
would suffice that when there are two causes or more that the plaintiff 
need only show “with reasonable certainty that the direct cause was 
one for which the defendant was liable.”175 Two physicians, relying on 
a bacteriologist’s proof of contamination and a “table of statistics” for a 
period of several years, opined that, in their opinion, the plaintiff had 
presented sufficient evidence to conclude he had “contracted typhoid 
from drinking polluted water.”176 The New York high court’s use of 
circumstantial evidence—ruling out possible causes to make a 
reasonable inference of causation (a method today known as 
differential etiology)—was sound.177 
 
 169. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 76, at 24–25, 42. 
 170. Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1908) (allowing apportionment 
according to fault). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE DEFINED § 463 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: 
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY § 979 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 12–17 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 171. Stubbs v. Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (N.Y. 1919). 
 172. Id. at 137. 
 173. Id. at 138. 
 174. Id. at 140. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 139. 
 177. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 761 (3d Cir. 1994); Creanga v. 
Jardal, 886 A.2d 633, 639–40 (N.J. 2005); see also Ruggiero v. Warner Lambert, 424 F.3d 
249, 254 (2d Cir. 2005); John B. Wong et al., Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in 
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Nor was much attention paid to evidentiary reliability. The case long 
cited for admissibility of a scientific technique—Frye v. United States—
rejected the use of an early lie detector test because its theory was 
“not generally accepted.”178 But until Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
was adopted in 1974, the only courts relying on Frye’s “general 
acceptance” standard were criminal prosecutions.179 There was 
skepticism about the use of scientific evidence because it was feared 
that jurors’ awe of the scientist could undermine the integrity of jury 
verdicts.180 Judges had  restricted use of expert testimony by such 
means as rulings that, where a matter was within the common 
knowledge of the jury, expert opinion evidence could be excluded as 
unnecessary.181 The key 1974  rule change was Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702. It provided that expert opinion testimony was 
admissible if it would “assist” the trier of fact.182 
The adoption of the new Federal Rules of Evidence was coincident 
with the Fifth Circuit’s landmark asbestos opinion in Borel v. 
Fiberboard Paper Products Corp.183 Judge John Minor Wisdom’s 
landmark Fifth Circuit opinion is widely credited with opening the 
floodgates of asbestos product liability litigation.184 Soon thereafter 
Irving Selikoff’s book Asbestos and Disease was published.185 It has 
 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 687, 704–07 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE]. 
 178. United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)) (explaining that expert opinion based on 
a scientific technique “is admissible if it is generally accepted as a reliable technique among 
the scientific community”).  
 179. A Westlaw key cite search for cases citing Frye v. United States shows seventy-two 
cases, virtually all criminal cases, until the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 
1974. 
 180.   
Scientific evidence impresses lay jurors. They tend to assume it is more accurate 
and objective than lay testimony. A juror who thinks of scientific evidence 
visualizes instruments capable of amazingly precise measurement, of findings 
arrived at by dispassionate scientific tests. In short, in the mind of the typical lay 
juror, a scientific witness has a special aura of credibility. 
EDWARD C. CLEARY, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 437 (2d 
ed. 1972). 
 181. James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers’ Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts 
About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding Expert 
Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 619 n.2 (1984).  
 182. Id. at 628 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).  
 183. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).  
 184. Robreno, supra note 7, at 105 n.44. 
 185. See generally SELIKOFF & LEE, supra note 141. 
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been relied upon in ninety-one published opinions.186 But phenomena 
like “synergistic effects” of asbestos use and tobacco exposure created 
challenging proof problems.187 At the outer limit, one had to show 
“regular, frequent, and proximate” exposure to the dust.188 
This wide scale use of expert opinion testimony in so-called “toxic 
tort” cases changed the course of litigation.189 Judge Robreno, 
manager of the MDL-875 for many years, wrote “[b]y the late 1980s, 
it was clear that the courts were faced with the most complicated 
litigation in substance and far-reaching in impact in American 
history.”190 But these massive asbestos product liability cases—
virtually all arising from third-party workplace tort actions—greatly 
increased the competence of the courts in handling scientific 
evidence.191  
The high point of strict liability in tort was the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s 1982 Beshada v. Johns Manville decision.192 The court 
rejected the asbestos manufacturer’s claim that it could not have known 
of the dangers of asbestos until Selikoff’s 1964 conference. The court 
found as a matter of law that the company was chargeable with 
knowledge of the dangers of its products. That principle gave rise to a 
duty to warn users.193 
Strict liability focused attention on how cause in fact could be 
established in what were commonly referred to as “toxic tort” cases. 
One view, embraced by Judge Jack Weinstein in the “Agent Orange” 
cases, was that only biostatistical evidence could suffice, and that in 
such a case “[a]t least a two-fold increase in incidence of the disease 
 
 186. Westlaw KeyCite search shows ninety-one published decisions from all U.S. 
courts. 
 187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 5, 
§ 28, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (amended 2016). 
 188. Thacker v. UNR Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1992); Spain v. Owens 
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 710 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), overruled by Nolan 
v. Weil-McLain, 910 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. 2009). See generally Wilson v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 5, 
§ 28, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (amended 2016); Robreno, supra note 7, at 138. 
 190. Robreno, supra note 7, at 107. 
 191. See Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 177, at 9, 
17–18. In 2011, the Federal Judicial Center and the National Research Council of the 
National Academies published the third edition of their Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence. Judges are advised on admissibility and the nature of science, and provided 
“reference guides” on the methods of fourteen fields including statistics, survey research, 
economic damages, exposure science, epidemiology, and toxicology.  
 192. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). 
 193. Id. at 549. 
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attributable to . . . exposure is required to permit recovery if 
epidemiological studies alone are relied upon.”194 This measure had 
been suggested as a legal threshold for epidemiological proof of 
causation of disease by Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld.195 
In 1987 Weinstein and Berger, in their treatise, pointed more 
broadly to seven factors for evaluating the admissibility of scientific 
evidence: 1) the technique’s general acceptance in the field; 2) expert’s 
qualifications and stature; 3) the use made of the technique; 4) potential 
rate of error; 5) existence of specialized literature; 6) the novelty of the 
invention; and 7) the degree of objectivity and subjectivity of the 
technique.196 
Many courts emphasized a plaintiff-friendly methodology-based 
standard for determining evidentiary reliability with respect to novel or 
emerging complex scientific theories of causation.197 In Rubanick v. 
Witco Chemical the New Jersey Supreme Court took an expansive view 
of competence of experts. It found admissible testimony on individual 
causal relationship by a research chemist and cancer researcher—even 
though he had never, and would never, examine or diagnose a 
patient.198   In Landrigan v. Celotex, an asbestos case in which plaintiff 
alleged he contracted colon cancer due to workplace asbestos exposure, 
the New Jersey high court rejected the doubled risk standard embraced 
by Judge Weinstein and propounded by Black—in favor of a 
circumstantial all-things-considered approach.199  
Defendants pressed to sharply restrict the use of expert testimony 
to opinions which were “generally accepted.” In Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by the 
influential Judge Alex Kozinski, embraced the argument, saying: 
 
194.  In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
195.  See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984). 
196.  3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL ¶ 
702[03] (1987). 
197.  See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 363–67 (5th Cir. 
1990) (holding plaintiffs’ sole expert could testify that exposure to fumes containing nickel 
and cadmium caused decedent's colon cancer and that an expert causation opinion should 
be excluded only if “fundamentally unsupported” and “would not actually assist the jury 
in arriving at an intelligent and sound verdict”); Osburn v.  Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d 
908, 914–16 (5th Cir. 1987) (holing plaintiffs’ experts could testify that chloramphenicol 
caused user’s leukemia, that an expert’s  opinion “need not  be generally accepted in the 
scientific community before it can be sufficiently reliable and probative to support a jury 
finding”); see also Graham v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 906 F.2d 1399, 1404 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(holding plaintiffs’ experts could testify that diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis 
vaccinations caused plaintiffs’ brain damage). 
198. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 735, 749 (N.J. 1991). 
199.  Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1088–90 (N.J. 1992).  
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“[t]he best test of certainty we have is good science—the science of 
publication, replication, and verification, the science of consensus and 
peer review.”200 
In Daubert—a drug product liability case—the Supreme Court 
squarely faced the question of how a judge should review the 
admissibility of scientific evidence when offered.201 While 
acknowledging that judges should act as “gatekeepers,” the Court 
rejected the “general acceptance” standard as incompatible with 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The majority embraced as a test of 
admissibility the “soundness of the methods employed,” directing 
judges to review, not conclusions, but methods, and recognized a 
category of “shaky but admissible evidence.”202  
Conservative judges, however, embraced the gatekeeping function 
with a vengeance. Daubert told judges to conduct a pre-trial review of 
complex scientific evidence.203 Many courts saw it as a chance to thin 
dockets, using it in hundreds of cases to strike civil plaintiffs’ claims.204 
The Supreme Court’s 1997 embrace of the abuse of discretion standard 
of review of admissibility rulings gave judges wide discretion to act on 
their own preferences. Judges could effectively grant summary judgment 
on causation without being subject to de novo review.205 
In 1999, the Supreme Court declared that all expert testimony was 
subject to the Daubert principles.206 Justice Breyer’s opinion for the 
court in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael was a substantial victory for 
plaintiffs because it emphasized flexibility.207 And, driven by the wide 
range of issues to be reviewed, Justice Breyer provided a sensible 
standard—that experts should use in court the degree of rigor 
customary in their fields.208 Despite Kumho’s objective standard, 
scientific evidence met an uneven reception in the courts—advancing 
the rigor with which lawyers approached their proofs. 
Shortly after Daubert, hoping to increase judicial competence, the 
Federal Judicial Center developed a Reference Manual on Scientific 
 
200. 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled by Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 201. 509 U.S. 579 (1993), codified by FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in Kansas City S. 
Ry. Co. v. Sny Island Levee Drainage Dist., 831 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 202. Id. at 596. 
 203. Id. 
 204. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 147 (2000).  
 205. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138 (1997). 
 206. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141–42 (1999). 
 207. Id. at 158. 
 208. Id. at 152. 
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Evidence to guide judges. Now in its third edition the Manual 
addresses “how science works,” admissibility and “Reference Guides” 
on the use of statistics, estimation of economic damage, epidemiology, 
toxicology, and neuroscience, among other fields.209 
Even after Kumho, plaintiffs’ lawyers encountered substantial 
resistance by judges who embraced and often rigidly applied the four 
Daubert-suggested considerations—now codified in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence 702.210 Jerome Kassirer and Joseph Cecil,211 key contributors 
to the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual, identified the 
problem and presented their opinions in the pages of the Journal of the 
American Medical Association in 2002.212 They explained: “[i]n some 
instances, judges have excluded medical testimony on cause and effect 
relationships unless it is based on published, peer reviewed, 
epidemiologically sound studies, even though practitioners rely on other 
evidence of causality in making decisions when such studies are not 
available,”213 and that, “[c]ourts tend to assess separately the reliability 
of each component rather than assessing the reliability of the ‘totality of 
the evidence’ including all relevant clinical factors. In doing so courts 
fail to take into account the complex inferential process that lies at the 
heart of clinical method reasoning.”214 
As had been argued by pro-plaintiff experts in Daubert,215 the 
Reference Manual seeks to teach judges that as former California 
Institute of Technology Vice Provost David Goodstein explained, 
“science is above all an adversarial process. It is an arena in which 
ideas do battle,” thus fitting it comfortably into the law’s adversarial 
 
 209. See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 177. 
 210. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based 
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 
the case.”). 
 211. Kassirer was the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. Joseph 
Cecil was director of the Reference Manual project at the Federal Judicial Center. 
 212. See Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for 
Medical Testimony: Disorder in the Courts, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1382 (2002).  
 213. Id. at 1382.  
 214. Id. at 1386. 
 215. Brief for Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 479 (1993) (No. 92-102). 
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framework.216  That this proposition has such endorsement is a 
victory won by plaintiffs through protracted struggle.  
C. Doctrinal challenges 
The plaintiffs’ lawyers and their efforts have been widely 
disparaged—their success painted as greed, or the product of dishonesty, 
etc. Professor Anita Bernstein—a stranger to the litigation—reviewed the 
evidence and recognized plaintiffs’ lawyers’ collective achievements as 
zealous advocates for their clients.217 In her article Asbestos 
Achievements, she concluded from her review of the controversial history: 
Asbestos liability . . . reveals clients who were retained and 
compensated. Antagonists were won over. Claims were 
strengthened by aggregation. Settlements were negotiated. 
Procedural hurdles were overcome. Evidentiary rules were 
made more permissive. Statutes of limitation, the province of 
legislatures, were revised by judges in a plaintiff-favoring 
direction. Hazards were exposed. Large business corporations 
were brought to their knees.218 
How did this come to pass?: 
Lawyers advocating for clients effected these achievements. 
They rewrote the law of civil procedure and torts, bringing 
redress to clients who had started out obstructed by 
conservative rules and presumptions. One may debate the 
merits of their doctrinal innovations; but at a minimum, their 
victories suggest new opportunities to other persons hurt by 
negligence and defective products. Even if one grants that these 
lawyers were as relentless, dishonest, and greed-crazed as their 
foes say—for the record, I will say here I doubt it—they set a 
record for achievement that, in magnitude, surpasses what 
almost anyone else in the history of American civil justice has 
ever accomplished.219 
Regardless of where we stand personally in relation to the litigation, we 
can share in a collective recognition that the zeal lawyers bring to their 
 
 216. David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE, supra note 177, at 37, 44. 
 217. Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 691, 715 (2008). 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id.  
  
1168 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1139 
cause is a powerful force and, as here, though imperfect, can do much to 
advance the cause of justice. 
VI. NETWORKS AND WEBS: FROM MASS PRODUCTION TO 
ATOMIZATION AND DIGITALIZATION 
Workers’ compensation laws arose in the era of mass industrial 
production. They were an important progressive measure to protect 
workers from illness and impoverishment. 
The common industrial working conditions of workers led them and 
their organizations—trade unions—to advocate the expansion of 
workers’ compensation systems so as to benefit members and non-
members. The labor movement and its progressive allies sought to 
provide health insurance and other workers’ compensation benefits to 
even the lowliest employee in a non-union shop. Workers’ 
compensation laws turned nearly all contracts of employment at will 
into contracts of adhesion—for the worker’s benefit. 
This was a dramatic transformation. It is no wonder that business 
attacked it. In 1911, the New York Court of Appeals agreed in Ives v. 
South Buffalo Railway Co.220 It concluded that the legislation was an 
abrogation of freedom of contract, confiscatory because an employer 
who has done its duty under the common law was nonetheless 
compelled to pay compensation for harms which occurred despite 
satisfaction of its duty of reasonable care.221 The state promptly 
amended the state constitution’s Bill of Rights, empowering the state 
to establish a workers’ compensation system as an exclusive 
remedy.222 
 
 220. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). 
 221. Id. at 440. 
If the legislature can say to an employer, ‘you must compensate your employee for 
an injury not caused by you or by your fault,’ why can it not go further and say to 
the man of wealth, ‘you have more property than you need and your neighbor is 
so poor that he can barely subsist; in the interest of natural justice you must 
divide with your neighbor so that he and his dependents shall not become a 
charge upon the State?’ 
Id. 
 222.  
Nothing contained in this constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the 
legislature to enact laws for the protection of the lives, health, or safety of 
employees; or for the payment, either by employers, or by employers and 
employees or otherwise, either directly or through a state or other system of 
insurance or otherwise, of compensation for injuries to employees or for death of 
employees resulting from such injuries without regard to fault as a cause thereof, 
except where the injury is occasioned by the willful intention of the injured 
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In 1911, eleven states enacted workers’ compensation laws. By 
1926, forty-six states had workers’ compensation laws. In 1948, 
the last state—Mississippi—made such systems nationwide.223 But 
coverage of occupational diseases lagged. Some statutes set up a 
“schedule” or exclusive list, specifying particular diseases as work-
related, while others used a more flexible, general definition.224 By 
1920, forty-five states and the federal government had workers’ 
compensation laws.225 But a 1964 report of the Bureau of Labor 
Standards found that coverage of occupational diseases still lagged 
behind that for accidental injury. At that time, only twenty-seven 
states allowed permanent partial disability for both accidental 
injuries and occupational diseases. The rest either barred indemnity 
for all occupational disease claims or sharply limited it, sometimes 
setting dollar caps but more often allowing no indemnity at all.226 
Nonetheless, there were significant numbers of cases. For example, in 
the period 1952–1961, the Industrial Commission of the Wisconsin 
Statistical Department reported that thousands of compensable 
occupational disease claims were settled each year—ranging from 
1,277 in 1952 to 960 in 1961.227 Arthur Larson reports that “[s]ince 
1950, the number of states having occupational disease coverage has 
grown from forty-four to fifty, and the number having general 
coverage has risen from twenty-seven to forty-six.”228 
Workers’ compensation across the board has afforded a public, 
rather than private remedy, and it has been broad in its definition of 
employment. While craftsmen were understood to be independent 
contractors, nearly everyone else has been treated as an employee. But 
 
employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or herself or of another, or 
where the injury results solely from the intoxication of the injured employee 
while on duty; or for the adjustment, determination and settlement, with or 
without trial by jury, of issues which may arise under such legislation; or to 
provide that the right of such compensation, and the remedy therefor shall be 
exclusive of all other rights and remedies for injuries to employees or for death 
resulting from such injuries; or to provide that the amount of such compensation 
for death shall not exceed a fixed or determinable sum; provided that all moneys 
paid by an employer to his or her employees or their legal representatives, by 
reason of the enactment of any of the laws herein authorized, shall be held to be a 
proper charge in the cost of operating the business of the employer.  
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
 223. SZYMENDERA, supra note 27, at 5, 29. 
 224. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 59, at 723. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 740.  
 228. 4-52 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 52.07 (2017). 
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in the brave new-networked world, the concept of independent 
contractor—familiar from tort law—threatens to sharply limit the scope 
of coverage. Both a public remedy and broad coverage are at risk. Uber 
asserts that its drivers (160,000 in California alone) are independent 
contractors who therefore must bear the risk of injury in a vehicular 
crash.229 Workers’ compensation has no cap on medical benefits, 
mandates disability benefits partially replacing lost wages, and affords 
death benefits. The effect of finding Uber’s drivers to be independent 
contractors would be to leave them to the vagaries of state mandatory 
insurance laws, and their individual choices regarding what first party 
insurance to buy.230 It is noteworthy that, according to NIOSH, motor 
vehicle crashes remain the leading cause of on-the-job death.231 
That battle—worker or independent contractor—remains 
unresolved. Judge Edward Chen, the U.S. District Court Judge who is 
handling O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, declared the issue may be 
resolved either by a jury or a judge under the California Private 
Attorneys General Act.232 The variances of coverage expectable from 
each state’s independent contractor laws ideally would impel a national 
solution of the sort that the OSHA-created233 National Commission on 
State Workmen’s Compensation Laws urged in its 1972 report; the 
Commission urged coverage as broad as that afforded by Social 
Security, noting that only a third of states covered agricultural workers 
and almost none covered household workers.234 
On the public remedy issue, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit has relegated Uber driverslike consumers of AT&T 
mobile phone services235to private arbitration, blocking a California 
doctrine that a bar on class actions was unconscionable.236 That state 
law was held to be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
 
 229. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1113–14 (N.D. Cal. 
2016). 
 230. See generally SZYMENDERA, supra note 27, at 11. 
 231. Motor Vehicle Crash Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/motorvehicle/resources/crashdata/facts.html  (last updated Oct. 5, 
2017). 
 232. 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1132–35 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 233. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 27, 84 Stat. 
1590, 1616–1618 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 655 (2004)). 
 234. NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS 46–47 (1972), 
http://workerscompresources.com/?page_id=28 (follow “Chapters 1 & 2”). 
 235. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 34752 (2011). 
 236. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 836 F.3d 1102, 111012 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing a 
finding of unconscionability by the trial court and holding that arbitrability is a matter for 
the arbitrator). 
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provides that contracts to arbitrate shall be treated like any other 
contract.237 
Today, the strength of workers’ compensation laws is under attack. 
Though it is unfashionable to say so, the class struggle continues and is 
much complicated by the change in technology. We are moving from a 
mass production factory model to a network-dominated and atomized 
workforce, which many confuse with freedom or autonomy. 
Our objective should be to preserve and expand the universalizing 
principles pioneered by workers’ compensation laws in the network era. 
And we should find a way to achieve the goals outlined in the 1972 report 
mandated by OSHA.238 Expansion includes the mandatory extension of 
coverage to millions of home-workers, drivers, self-employed carpentry 
contractors, and laborers unreasonably classified as independent 
contractors.239 
We need to establish thatlike employers in the eight-hour-day 
eraowners and controllers of today’s network businesses (Uber, 
Airbnb, RE/Max, Google, etc.) should be compelled to take on the kinds 
of responsibilities that were thrust upon direct employers one hundred 
years ago. Doctrinal tools like the relative “nature of the work” test, 
independent contractors, overtime, and minimum wage need to be 
tweaked to provide for today’s “freelancers” and “part-timers” the kind 
of universal coverage that the progressive era reforms provided for the 
great majority of workers—even those in small businesses. 
 
 237. Id. at 1106, 1108; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract. 
Id.  
 238. Report on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, supra note 79, at 31–32. 
 239. 5-63 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 63.01 (2017). 
